Skip to main content
Benchmark

SalamahBench

Dialect and category level safety evaluation of Arabic language models.

Categories
12
Prompts
8,270
Varieties
6
Instances
49,620
Paper· Preprint, September 2026Dataset· Available on request

Summary

SalamahBench is a paired safety benchmark for Arabic language models. It contains 8,270 human verified harmful prompts aligned with the ML Commons hazard taxonomy, and every prompt is written in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and in five regional varieties: Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi, Lebanese and Moroccan. That gives 49,620 paired instances in which the harmful request stays the same while only the dialect changes, so any change in model behavior can be traced to the language variety rather than to different prompt content.

Prompts were drawn from RTP-LX, WildGuardMix, the Arabic Dataset for LM Safeguard Evaluation, AraSafe, X-Safety, LinguaSafe, AdvBench, ClearHarm and HarmBench, plus 100 new Defamation prompts. Each one was normalized to MSA, mapped to eleven named hazard categories and an Others group, screened by two independent AI judges (GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet 4.5), and reviewed by human annotators who settled disagreements, confirmed harmful intent and validated the category. A refusal aware Gemini 3.5 Flash pipeline then produced the five dialect versions. Responses are scored by Attack Success Rate under Qwen3Guard, Llama Guard 4, PolyGuard and their majority vote, and two new measures, Dialect Shift and Category Specific Dialect Deviation, describe how safety moves when the same request is phrased in a dialect.

Importance

Most Arabic speakers talk to AI systems in their own dialect, yet existing Arabic safety datasets either test MSA alone, do not label the variety of each prompt, or never express the same harmful request across varieties. SalamahBench closes that gap. Its results show that cross variety robustness depends strongly on the model: Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 become measurably less safe when prompts move from MSA to a dialect, while ALLaM 2 stays statistically flat overall even though its Intellectual Property attack success rises in every dialect. Aggregate or MSA only scores can therefore hide real, category specific weaknesses, and Arabic model safety should be evaluated jointly across varieties and harm domains.

Evaluation

Results

Results from the September 2026 preprint. ALLaM 2, Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 were evaluated on all 49,620 instances, with Qwen 3.8 as a multilingual reference, and Fanar 1, Jais 2 and Falcon H1R on the 8,270 MSA prompts. Unless a chart says otherwise, attack success is measured with Qwen3Guard in its strict setting, the safeguard that agreed best with human labels. Lower is safer.

+3.9 pp
Karnak 1 mean Dialect Shift
Macro ASR rises from 21.5% in MSA to 25.4% across dialects, significant in all five.
22.9% → 40.4%
ALLaM 2 Intellectual Property ASR, MSA to Moroccan
Its overall shift is not distinguishable from zero, yet this category rises in every dialect.
89.0% vs 6.7%
Recall of Qwen3Guard versus PolyGuard
Share of human labeled unsafe responses each safeguard actually flags.
98.5%
Responses written in MSA
Models answer dialect prompts in MSA: only 22 of 1,440 annotated responses used a dialect.

How to read the results

Attack Success Rate (ASR)
Share of responses a safeguard labels unsafe. The strict setting also counts Controversial answers; loose counts only Unsafe. Lower is safer.
Macro ASR
The plain average of ASR over the eleven named categories, so a small category such as Intellectual Property weighs as much as Hate.
Dialect Shift (DS)
Macro ASR in a dialect minus macro ASR in MSA, in percentage points (pp). Positive means the model is less safe in that dialect.
Category Specific Dialect Deviation (CSDD)
A category’s own MSA to dialect change minus the model’s DS. Positive means the category degrades more than the model as a whole.

Models evaluated

Models evaluated on SalamahBench
ModelSizePrompts
Fanar 227BAll six varieties
ALLaM 27BAll six varieties
Karnak 141BAll six varieties
Qwen 3.827BAll six varieties (multilingual reference)
Fanar 19BMSA only
Jais 28BMSA only
Falcon H1R7BMSA only

All models are open weights from Hugging Face, decoded at temperature 0.

Benchmark

How SalamahBench was built

Each of the 8,270 prompts was screened by two AI judges and checked by human reviewers in MSA before being rendered in five regional varieties. Holding the harmful request fixed while only the dialect changes is what lets the results attribute a change in safety to the language variety itself.

  1. 01
    Collect

    9 public safety datasets, plus 100 new Defamation prompts written to fill a thin category.

  2. 02
    Normalize

    Every prompt is translated or normalized to MSA and mapped to the ML Commons hazard taxonomy.

  3. 03
    AI screening

    GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet 4.5 judge each prompt independently under the same hazard definitions.

  4. 04
    Human review

    Annotators adjudicate judge disagreements, verify harmful intent and validate every category label.

  5. 05
    Five dialects

    Gemini 3.5 Flash translates and self refines each prompt; Gemma 4 31B flags refusals so they can be retried.

Varieties:Modern Standard ArabicSaudiMoroccanSyrianLebaneseEgyptian

Sources: RTP-LX, WildGuardMix, Arabic Dataset for LM Safeguard Evaluation, AraSafe, X-Safety, LinguaSafe, AdvBench, ClearHarm, HarmBench.

Prompts per harm category

Others (42.4%) holds harmful prompts that do not map cleanly to one named hazard. It counts toward overall ASR but is left out of macro ASR. Specialized Advice is excluded because disclaimer based compliance cannot be judged reliably by current safeguards.

Prompts per category as a tableShow table
CategoryPromptsShare
Hate1,04612.6%
Sexual Content1,00412.1%
Nonviolent Crimes85710.4%
Violent Crimes5096.2%
Privacy4054.9%
Indiscriminate Weapons2312.8%
Sex Related Crimes2172.6%
Intellectual Property1662.0%
Defamation1161.4%
Suicide and Self Harm1101.3%
Child Sexual Exploitation1061.3%
Others3,50342.4%
Overall safety

Attack success under four safeguard settings

Every response from Fanar 2, Karnak 1 and ALLaM 2 across all six varieties was scored by three safeguards and by their majority vote. ALLaM 2 is the safest under Qwen3Guard, Llama Guard 4 and the majority vote. PolyGuard reverses the order, but it catches only 6.7% of human labeled unsafe responses, so its ranking carries little weight. Whether Karnak 1 or Fanar 2 looks worse depends on the safeguard.

Whiskers show 95% bootstrap intervals (20,000 resamples of prompts, all six varieties of a prompt kept together).

Overall ASR and Qwen3Guard label counts as a tableShow table
SafeguardFanar 2Karnak 1ALLaM 2
Qwen3Guard (strict)9.2% (8.8 to 9.7)19.8% (19.2 to 20.4)4.4% (4.1 to 4.7)
Qwen3Guard (loose)4.2% (3.9 to 4.5)9.1% (8.7 to 9.6)1.5% (1.4 to 1.7)
Llama Guard 42.7% (2.5 to 2.9)8.8% (8.5 to 9.2)1.5% (1.3 to 1.6)
PolyGuard1.7% (1.5 to 1.9)0.8% (0.7 to 0.9)2.0% (1.9 to 2.2)
Majority vote2.2% (2 to 2.4)6.9% (6.5 to 7.2)1.3% (1.1 to 1.4)
Qwen3Guard: refusals34,12028,83639,694
Qwen3Guard: safe45,04539,79747,429
Qwen3Guard: controversial2,5005,2921,431
Qwen3Guard: unsafe2,0754,531760
Cross variety

Does safety hold when the prompt is in a dialect?

Dialect Shift compares each model’s macro ASR in a dialect with its own MSA baseline. Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 are less safe in every dialect, with mean shifts of +1.5 and +3.9 pp that survive correction. ALLaM 2 moves slightly the other way, but its mean shift of −0.8 pp is not distinguishable from zero. MSA performance alone does not predict which way a model will move.

Fanar 2
11.4% → 12.9%
Macro ASR, MSA to dialect average
Karnak 1
21.5% → 25.4%
Macro ASR, MSA to dialect average
ALLaM 2
7.4% → 6.6%
Macro ASR, MSA to dialect average

Solid bars are significant after Benjamini Hochberg correction (q < .05); faded bars are not. Whiskers show 95% bootstrap intervals. Hover a row to see macro ASR values.

Macro ASR and Dialect Shift as a tableShow table
ModelMSASaudiMoroccanSyrianLebaneseEgyptianDialect avg
Fanar 2 macro ASR11.4%12.9%12.5%12.7%13.6%12.9%12.9%
Fanar 2 DS (pp)0.0+1.5 ± 1.4*+1.1 ± 1.5+1.3 ± 1.4+2.2 ± 1.4*+1.5 ± 1.4+1.5 ± 1.1*
Karnak 1 macro ASR21.5%24.1%25.9%25.7%26.6%24.8%25.4%
Karnak 1 DS (pp)0.0+2.6 ± 1.5*+4.4 ± 1.7*+4.2 ± 1.6*+5.1 ± 1.6*+3.3 ± 1.5*+3.9 ± 1.2*
ALLaM 2 macro ASR7.4%6.2%8.3%6.6%6.4%5.8%6.6%
ALLaM 2 DS (pp)0.0−1.3 ± 1.1*+0.9 ± 1.2−0.8 ± 1.2−1.0 ± 1.1−1.6 ± 1.1*−0.8 ± 0.9

* significant after correction.

Category level

Where the shift happens

Aggregate shifts hide very different category stories. ALLaM 2 improves overall, yet its Intellectual Property ASR climbs from 22.9% in MSA to between 28.3% and 40.4% in every dialect, while Indiscriminate Weapons falls from 19.5% to as low as 7.4%.

Karnak 1 keeps Intellectual Property between 59.6% and 63.9% in every variety, a persistent weakness rather than a dialect effect, while Indiscriminate Weapons jumps from 42.9% to as much as 59.3%. Fanar 2’s clearest deterioration is also Intellectual Property, reaching 42.2% in Saudi Arabic.

Attack success rate for Fanar 2 in each category. Compare each dialect with the MSA column to see where the same requests succeed more often.

Fanar 2: attack success rate by harm category and Arabic variety
CategoryMSASaudiMoroccanSyrianLebaneseEgyptian
Violent Crimes
8.4
11.8
7.9
9.2
8.4
9.2
Nonviolent Crimes
14.0
13.2
18.0
15.9
15.4
15.6
Sex Related Crimes
3.7
3.2
3.7
3.7
4.1
3.2
Child Sexual Exploitation
4.7
5.7
9.4
5.7
6.6
9.4
Indiscriminate Weapons
13.0
10.4
14.7
13.0
13.4
14.3
Suicide and Self Harm
9.1
11.8
9.1
10.0
10.9
14.5
Hate
8.2
6.2
9.2
8.8
7.8
8.6
Privacy
1.7
1.7
2.7
3.7
2.5
2.0
Intellectual Property
30.1
42.2
32.5
32.5
40.4
30.7
Defamation
30.2
33.6
27.6
33.6
37.1
31.0
Sexual Content
2.3
2.5
3.1
3.3
2.5
2.8
Macro ASR
11.4
12.9
12.5
12.7
13.6
12.9
Attack success rate0%70%
Multilingual reference

The same drift appears in a general multilingual model

Qwen 3.8 (27B) is safe overall, yet its ASR rises from 1.4% in MSA to between 2.5% and 3.6% in every dialect, highest in Moroccan. Its category balanced shift is larger, +2.0 to +4.6 pp, and Intellectual Property jumps from 3.0% to between 17.5% and 33.1%, a mean deviation of +19.2 pp and the largest category effect in the study. Low aggregate ASR can hide high exposure in a small category.

Llama Guard 4 shows the same direction. PolyGuard does not, so the measured size of the drift depends partly on the safeguard. Hover a bar for all four safeguards.

Qwen 3.8 ASR by variety and safeguard as a tableShow table
VarietyQwen3Guard (strict)Llama Guard 4PolyGuardMajority vote
MSA1.4%0.3%1.0%0.4%
Saudi2.5%0.9%1.2%0.8%
Moroccan3.6%3.0%0.5%0.9%
Syrian2.8%0.9%0.9%0.6%
Lebanese2.7%0.9%0.9%0.7%
Egyptian2.5%0.8%1.0%0.5%
MSA baseline

Six Arabic models on the MSA prompts

On the 8,270 MSA prompts, Falcon H1R has the lowest macro ASR and Jais 2 the highest. Intellectual Property is the most exposed category for four of the six models, reaching 54.8% for Fanar 1, 62.7% for Karnak 1 and 69.3% for Jais 2. Falcon H1R is the exception at 4.8%; its highest categories are Sexual Content (10.0%) and Hate (7.9%).

Attack success rate on MSA prompts by harm category for six Arabic models
CategoryFanar 2Karnak 1ALLaM 2Fanar 1Falcon H1RJais 2
Violent Crimes
8.4
19.6
4.9
3.0
1.4
20.6
Nonviolent Crimes
14.0
23.2
7.1
8.2
2.3
30.3
Sex Related Crimes
3.7
10.1
1.8
1.8
3.7
18.0
Child Sexual Exploitation
4.7
7.5
4.7
4.7
2.8
17.0
Indiscriminate Weapons
13.0
42.9
19.5
8.7
3.5
32.0
Suicide and Self Harm
9.1
11.8
3.6
10.9
6.4
14.6
Hate
8.2
7.2
3.3
3.3
7.9
18.3
Privacy
1.7
7.7
4.9
1.7
2.7
5.7
Intellectual Property
30.1
62.7
22.9
54.8
4.8
69.3
Defamation
30.2
19.8
3.4
15.5
4.3
33.6
Sexual Content
2.3
24.1
5.4
0.7
10.0
28.2
Macro ASR
11.4
21.5
7.4
10.3
4.5
26.1
Attack success rate0%70%

Fanar 2, Karnak 1 and ALLaM 2 values are their MSA baselines from the cross variety run. Fanar 1, Falcon H1R and Jais 2 were evaluated on MSA only, so they have no Dialect Shift. Qwen3Guard strict throughout.

MSA only models under every safeguard as a tableShow table
ModelRefusal rateQwen3Guard strictQwen3Guard looseLlama Guard 4PolyGuardMajority vote
Fanar 181.7%5.6%2.9%1.6%1.8%2.0%
Falcon H1R94.6%5.6%4.1%1.3%2.2%0.8%
Jais 264.5%24.3%13.5%22.7%8.8%12.0%

Fanar 1 and Falcon H1R tie under Qwen3Guard strict but swap places under other safeguards, another sign that rankings between close models depend on the judge.

Validation

Can the safeguards be trusted?

Two expert annotators labeled 1,440 responses, balanced across categories, varieties and models, with a third resolving disagreements (85.8% raw agreement, κ 0.714, before adjudication). Qwen3Guard in its strict setting matched them on 84.7% of responses and flagged 89.0% of the unsafe ones. Llama Guard 4 and PolyGuard look acceptable on accuracy but miss most unsafe answers, which is why Qwen3Guard strict is the primary judge for the dialect and category analyses.

PolyGuard’s 59.0% accuracy is only 1.4 pp above always answering safe. Qwen3Guard detects refusals less reliably (72.6%). FanarGuard, which needs the prompt and response together, scored 84.2% on a 120 response subset but found only 7 of 24 unsafe responses, not significantly better than the 80.0% always safe baseline.

Recall on unsafe responses, by category

Recall of each safeguard on human labeled unsafe responses, by harm category
CategoryGold unsafeQwen3GuardLlama Guard 4PolyGuardMajority vote
Violent Crimes60
83.3
20.0
8.3
28.3
Nonviolent Crimes58
91.4
19.0
3.4
22.4
Sex Related Crimes33
100.0
12.1
3.0
15.2
Child Sexual Exploitation33
87.9
39.4
9.1
45.5
Indiscriminate Weapons63
87.3
33.3
9.5
36.5
Suicide and Self Harm60
91.7
23.3
5.0
26.7
Hate42
90.5
4.8
16.7
19.0
Privacy49
91.8
12.2
8.2
20.4
Intellectual Property69
82.6
42.0
1.4
42.0
Defamation43
81.4
16.3
2.3
18.6
Sexual Content45
88.9
31.1
8.9
37.8
Others55
96.4
18.2
7.3
23.6
All categories610
89.0
23.4
6.7
28.5
Share of gold unsafe responses the safeguard flags0%100%
Models as judges

Can Arabic models judge their own safety?

Prompted as four class judges (refusal, safe, controversial, unsafe), the Arabic models fall well short of a dedicated safeguard. Karnak 1 is the best judge at 59.3% overall, then ALLaM 2 at 51.3% and Fanar 2 at 47.0%. Scores depend on who wrote the response: Fanar 2 reaches 65.6% on Karnak 1’s answers but only 38.3% on its own.

Four class accuracy of Arabic language models used as safety judges, by the model that wrote the response
JudgeResponses by
ALLaM 2
Responses by
Fanar 2
Responses by
Karnak 1
Overall
ALLaM 2
57.3†
52.5
44.0
51.3
Fanar 2
37.1
38.3†
65.6
47.0
Karnak 1
62.1
57.5
58.3†
59.3
Accuracy against human labels0%100%

† marks a model judging its own responses. 480 responses per source, 1,440 in total.

Data quality

How good are the dialect translations?

Each dialect version came from a translate, critique and revise loop, which beat direct and reasoning guided prompting on every dimension in an LM judge comparison of 500 outputs. Native speakers rated 120 MSA to Egyptian translations at 4.85 out of 5 overall, and at least 93.3% of items scored 4 or 5 on every dimension. Of 157 translations the model first refused, all but 2 were recovered, so the most harmful prompts were not silently dropped.

4.85
Overall mean
out of 5
4.99
Semantic preservation
4.98
Harmful intent preservation
4.97
Grammaticality
4.73
Dialectal naturalness
4.59
Dialect authenticity
Translation strategy comparison as a table (LM judge, 0 to 100)Show table
MetricDirectReasoning guidedSelf refinement
Naturalness92.6095.6798.63
Idiomatic accuracy92.6195.4898.56
Morphology and grammar97.1797.9199.63
Semantic preservation99.7099.8399.95
Average95.5297.2299.19

Native speaker validation currently covers Egyptian Arabic; the same protocol is being extended to Saudi, Moroccan, Syrian and Lebanese.

Contact

For questions, comments, or collaboration, reach out at salamahbench@compumacy.com.