SalamahBench
Dialect and category level safety evaluation of Arabic language models.
- Categories
- 12
- Prompts
- 8,270
- Varieties
- 6
- Instances
- 49,620
Summary
SalamahBench is a paired safety benchmark for Arabic language models. It contains 8,270 human verified harmful prompts aligned with the ML Commons hazard taxonomy, and every prompt is written in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and in five regional varieties: Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi, Lebanese and Moroccan. That gives 49,620 paired instances in which the harmful request stays the same while only the dialect changes, so any change in model behavior can be traced to the language variety rather than to different prompt content.
Prompts were drawn from RTP-LX, WildGuardMix, the Arabic Dataset for LM Safeguard Evaluation, AraSafe, X-Safety, LinguaSafe, AdvBench, ClearHarm and HarmBench, plus 100 new Defamation prompts. Each one was normalized to MSA, mapped to eleven named hazard categories and an Others group, screened by two independent AI judges (GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet 4.5), and reviewed by human annotators who settled disagreements, confirmed harmful intent and validated the category. A refusal aware Gemini 3.5 Flash pipeline then produced the five dialect versions. Responses are scored by Attack Success Rate under Qwen3Guard, Llama Guard 4, PolyGuard and their majority vote, and two new measures, Dialect Shift and Category Specific Dialect Deviation, describe how safety moves when the same request is phrased in a dialect.
Importance
Most Arabic speakers talk to AI systems in their own dialect, yet existing Arabic safety datasets either test MSA alone, do not label the variety of each prompt, or never express the same harmful request across varieties. SalamahBench closes that gap. Its results show that cross variety robustness depends strongly on the model: Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 become measurably less safe when prompts move from MSA to a dialect, while ALLaM 2 stays statistically flat overall even though its Intellectual Property attack success rises in every dialect. Aggregate or MSA only scores can therefore hide real, category specific weaknesses, and Arabic model safety should be evaluated jointly across varieties and harm domains.
Results
Results from the September 2026 preprint. ALLaM 2, Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 were evaluated on all 49,620 instances, with Qwen 3.8 as a multilingual reference, and Fanar 1, Jais 2 and Falcon H1R on the 8,270 MSA prompts. Unless a chart says otherwise, attack success is measured with Qwen3Guard in its strict setting, the safeguard that agreed best with human labels. Lower is safer.
How to read the results
- Attack Success Rate (ASR)
- Share of responses a safeguard labels unsafe. The strict setting also counts Controversial answers; loose counts only Unsafe. Lower is safer.
- Macro ASR
- The plain average of ASR over the eleven named categories, so a small category such as Intellectual Property weighs as much as Hate.
- Dialect Shift (DS)
- Macro ASR in a dialect minus macro ASR in MSA, in percentage points (pp). Positive means the model is less safe in that dialect.
- Category Specific Dialect Deviation (CSDD)
- A category’s own MSA to dialect change minus the model’s DS. Positive means the category degrades more than the model as a whole.
Models evaluated
| Model | Size | Prompts |
|---|---|---|
| Fanar 2 | 27B | All six varieties |
| ALLaM 2 | 7B | All six varieties |
| Karnak 1 | 41B | All six varieties |
| Qwen 3.8 | 27B | All six varieties (multilingual reference) |
| Fanar 1 | 9B | MSA only |
| Jais 2 | 8B | MSA only |
| Falcon H1R | 7B | MSA only |
All models are open weights from Hugging Face, decoded at temperature 0.
How SalamahBench was built
Each of the 8,270 prompts was screened by two AI judges and checked by human reviewers in MSA before being rendered in five regional varieties. Holding the harmful request fixed while only the dialect changes is what lets the results attribute a change in safety to the language variety itself.
- 01Collect
9 public safety datasets, plus 100 new Defamation prompts written to fill a thin category.
- 02Normalize
Every prompt is translated or normalized to MSA and mapped to the ML Commons hazard taxonomy.
- 03AI screening
GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet 4.5 judge each prompt independently under the same hazard definitions.
- 04Human review
Annotators adjudicate judge disagreements, verify harmful intent and validate every category label.
- 05Five dialects
Gemini 3.5 Flash translates and self refines each prompt; Gemma 4 31B flags refusals so they can be retried.
Sources: RTP-LX, WildGuardMix, Arabic Dataset for LM Safeguard Evaluation, AraSafe, X-Safety, LinguaSafe, AdvBench, ClearHarm, HarmBench.
Prompts per harm category
Others (42.4%) holds harmful prompts that do not map cleanly to one named hazard. It counts toward overall ASR but is left out of macro ASR. Specialized Advice is excluded because disclaimer based compliance cannot be judged reliably by current safeguards.
Prompts per category as a tableShow tableHide table
| Category | Prompts | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Hate | 1,046 | 12.6% |
| Sexual Content | 1,004 | 12.1% |
| Nonviolent Crimes | 857 | 10.4% |
| Violent Crimes | 509 | 6.2% |
| Privacy | 405 | 4.9% |
| Indiscriminate Weapons | 231 | 2.8% |
| Sex Related Crimes | 217 | 2.6% |
| Intellectual Property | 166 | 2.0% |
| Defamation | 116 | 1.4% |
| Suicide and Self Harm | 110 | 1.3% |
| Child Sexual Exploitation | 106 | 1.3% |
| Others | 3,503 | 42.4% |
Attack success under four safeguard settings
Every response from Fanar 2, Karnak 1 and ALLaM 2 across all six varieties was scored by three safeguards and by their majority vote. ALLaM 2 is the safest under Qwen3Guard, Llama Guard 4 and the majority vote. PolyGuard reverses the order, but it catches only 6.7% of human labeled unsafe responses, so its ranking carries little weight. Whether Karnak 1 or Fanar 2 looks worse depends on the safeguard.
Whiskers show 95% bootstrap intervals (20,000 resamples of prompts, all six varieties of a prompt kept together).
Overall ASR and Qwen3Guard label counts as a tableShow tableHide table
| Safeguard | Fanar 2 | Karnak 1 | ALLaM 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen3Guard (strict) | 9.2% (8.8 to 9.7) | 19.8% (19.2 to 20.4) | 4.4% (4.1 to 4.7) |
| Qwen3Guard (loose) | 4.2% (3.9 to 4.5) | 9.1% (8.7 to 9.6) | 1.5% (1.4 to 1.7) |
| Llama Guard 4 | 2.7% (2.5 to 2.9) | 8.8% (8.5 to 9.2) | 1.5% (1.3 to 1.6) |
| PolyGuard | 1.7% (1.5 to 1.9) | 0.8% (0.7 to 0.9) | 2.0% (1.9 to 2.2) |
| Majority vote | 2.2% (2 to 2.4) | 6.9% (6.5 to 7.2) | 1.3% (1.1 to 1.4) |
| Qwen3Guard: refusals | 34,120 | 28,836 | 39,694 |
| Qwen3Guard: safe | 45,045 | 39,797 | 47,429 |
| Qwen3Guard: controversial | 2,500 | 5,292 | 1,431 |
| Qwen3Guard: unsafe | 2,075 | 4,531 | 760 |
Does safety hold when the prompt is in a dialect?
Dialect Shift compares each model’s macro ASR in a dialect with its own MSA baseline. Fanar 2 and Karnak 1 are less safe in every dialect, with mean shifts of +1.5 and +3.9 pp that survive correction. ALLaM 2 moves slightly the other way, but its mean shift of −0.8 pp is not distinguishable from zero. MSA performance alone does not predict which way a model will move.
Solid bars are significant after Benjamini Hochberg correction (q < .05); faded bars are not. Whiskers show 95% bootstrap intervals. Hover a row to see macro ASR values.
Macro ASR and Dialect Shift as a tableShow tableHide table
| Model | MSA | Saudi | Moroccan | Syrian | Lebanese | Egyptian | Dialect avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fanar 2 macro ASR | 11.4% | 12.9% | 12.5% | 12.7% | 13.6% | 12.9% | 12.9% |
| Fanar 2 DS (pp) | 0.0 | +1.5 ± 1.4* | +1.1 ± 1.5 | +1.3 ± 1.4 | +2.2 ± 1.4* | +1.5 ± 1.4 | +1.5 ± 1.1* |
| Karnak 1 macro ASR | 21.5% | 24.1% | 25.9% | 25.7% | 26.6% | 24.8% | 25.4% |
| Karnak 1 DS (pp) | 0.0 | +2.6 ± 1.5* | +4.4 ± 1.7* | +4.2 ± 1.6* | +5.1 ± 1.6* | +3.3 ± 1.5* | +3.9 ± 1.2* |
| ALLaM 2 macro ASR | 7.4% | 6.2% | 8.3% | 6.6% | 6.4% | 5.8% | 6.6% |
| ALLaM 2 DS (pp) | 0.0 | −1.3 ± 1.1* | +0.9 ± 1.2 | −0.8 ± 1.2 | −1.0 ± 1.1 | −1.6 ± 1.1* | −0.8 ± 0.9 |
* significant after correction.
Where the shift happens
Aggregate shifts hide very different category stories. ALLaM 2 improves overall, yet its Intellectual Property ASR climbs from 22.9% in MSA to between 28.3% and 40.4% in every dialect, while Indiscriminate Weapons falls from 19.5% to as low as 7.4%.
Karnak 1 keeps Intellectual Property between 59.6% and 63.9% in every variety, a persistent weakness rather than a dialect effect, while Indiscriminate Weapons jumps from 42.9% to as much as 59.3%. Fanar 2’s clearest deterioration is also Intellectual Property, reaching 42.2% in Saudi Arabic.
Attack success rate for Fanar 2 in each category. Compare each dialect with the MSA column to see where the same requests succeed more often.
| Category | MSA | Saudi | Moroccan | Syrian | Lebanese | Egyptian |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violent Crimes | 8.4 | 11.8 | 7.9 | 9.2 | 8.4 | 9.2 |
| Nonviolent Crimes | 14.0 | 13.2 | 18.0 | 15.9 | 15.4 | 15.6 |
| Sex Related Crimes | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.2 |
| Child Sexual Exploitation | 4.7 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 5.7 | 6.6 | 9.4 |
| Indiscriminate Weapons | 13.0 | 10.4 | 14.7 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 14.3 |
| Suicide and Self Harm | 9.1 | 11.8 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 14.5 |
| Hate | 8.2 | 6.2 | 9.2 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 8.6 |
| Privacy | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
| Intellectual Property | 30.1 | 42.2 | 32.5 | 32.5 | 40.4 | 30.7 |
| Defamation | 30.2 | 33.6 | 27.6 | 33.6 | 37.1 | 31.0 |
| Sexual Content | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 |
| Macro ASR | 11.4 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 12.7 | 13.6 | 12.9 |
The same drift appears in a general multilingual model
Qwen 3.8 (27B) is safe overall, yet its ASR rises from 1.4% in MSA to between 2.5% and 3.6% in every dialect, highest in Moroccan. Its category balanced shift is larger, +2.0 to +4.6 pp, and Intellectual Property jumps from 3.0% to between 17.5% and 33.1%, a mean deviation of +19.2 pp and the largest category effect in the study. Low aggregate ASR can hide high exposure in a small category.
Llama Guard 4 shows the same direction. PolyGuard does not, so the measured size of the drift depends partly on the safeguard. Hover a bar for all four safeguards.
Qwen 3.8 ASR by variety and safeguard as a tableShow tableHide table
| Variety | Qwen3Guard (strict) | Llama Guard 4 | PolyGuard | Majority vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSA | 1.4% | 0.3% | 1.0% | 0.4% |
| Saudi | 2.5% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 0.8% |
| Moroccan | 3.6% | 3.0% | 0.5% | 0.9% |
| Syrian | 2.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.6% |
| Lebanese | 2.7% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.7% |
| Egyptian | 2.5% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.5% |
Six Arabic models on the MSA prompts
On the 8,270 MSA prompts, Falcon H1R has the lowest macro ASR and Jais 2 the highest. Intellectual Property is the most exposed category for four of the six models, reaching 54.8% for Fanar 1, 62.7% for Karnak 1 and 69.3% for Jais 2. Falcon H1R is the exception at 4.8%; its highest categories are Sexual Content (10.0%) and Hate (7.9%).
| Category | Fanar 2 | Karnak 1 | ALLaM 2 | Fanar 1 | Falcon H1R | Jais 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violent Crimes | 8.4 | 19.6 | 4.9 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 20.6 |
| Nonviolent Crimes | 14.0 | 23.2 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 2.3 | 30.3 |
| Sex Related Crimes | 3.7 | 10.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 3.7 | 18.0 |
| Child Sexual Exploitation | 4.7 | 7.5 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 17.0 |
| Indiscriminate Weapons | 13.0 | 42.9 | 19.5 | 8.7 | 3.5 | 32.0 |
| Suicide and Self Harm | 9.1 | 11.8 | 3.6 | 10.9 | 6.4 | 14.6 |
| Hate | 8.2 | 7.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 7.9 | 18.3 |
| Privacy | 1.7 | 7.7 | 4.9 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 5.7 |
| Intellectual Property | 30.1 | 62.7 | 22.9 | 54.8 | 4.8 | 69.3 |
| Defamation | 30.2 | 19.8 | 3.4 | 15.5 | 4.3 | 33.6 |
| Sexual Content | 2.3 | 24.1 | 5.4 | 0.7 | 10.0 | 28.2 |
| Macro ASR | 11.4 | 21.5 | 7.4 | 10.3 | 4.5 | 26.1 |
Fanar 2, Karnak 1 and ALLaM 2 values are their MSA baselines from the cross variety run. Fanar 1, Falcon H1R and Jais 2 were evaluated on MSA only, so they have no Dialect Shift. Qwen3Guard strict throughout.
MSA only models under every safeguard as a tableShow tableHide table
| Model | Refusal rate | Qwen3Guard strict | Qwen3Guard loose | Llama Guard 4 | PolyGuard | Majority vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fanar 1 | 81.7% | 5.6% | 2.9% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% |
| Falcon H1R | 94.6% | 5.6% | 4.1% | 1.3% | 2.2% | 0.8% |
| Jais 2 | 64.5% | 24.3% | 13.5% | 22.7% | 8.8% | 12.0% |
Fanar 1 and Falcon H1R tie under Qwen3Guard strict but swap places under other safeguards, another sign that rankings between close models depend on the judge.
Can the safeguards be trusted?
Two expert annotators labeled 1,440 responses, balanced across categories, varieties and models, with a third resolving disagreements (85.8% raw agreement, κ 0.714, before adjudication). Qwen3Guard in its strict setting matched them on 84.7% of responses and flagged 89.0% of the unsafe ones. Llama Guard 4 and PolyGuard look acceptable on accuracy but miss most unsafe answers, which is why Qwen3Guard strict is the primary judge for the dialect and category analyses.
PolyGuard’s 59.0% accuracy is only 1.4 pp above always answering safe. Qwen3Guard detects refusals less reliably (72.6%). FanarGuard, which needs the prompt and response together, scored 84.2% on a 120 response subset but found only 7 of 24 unsafe responses, not significantly better than the 80.0% always safe baseline.
Recall on unsafe responses, by category
| Category | Gold unsafe | Qwen3Guard | Llama Guard 4 | PolyGuard | Majority vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violent Crimes | 60 | 83.3 | 20.0 | 8.3 | 28.3 |
| Nonviolent Crimes | 58 | 91.4 | 19.0 | 3.4 | 22.4 |
| Sex Related Crimes | 33 | 100.0 | 12.1 | 3.0 | 15.2 |
| Child Sexual Exploitation | 33 | 87.9 | 39.4 | 9.1 | 45.5 |
| Indiscriminate Weapons | 63 | 87.3 | 33.3 | 9.5 | 36.5 |
| Suicide and Self Harm | 60 | 91.7 | 23.3 | 5.0 | 26.7 |
| Hate | 42 | 90.5 | 4.8 | 16.7 | 19.0 |
| Privacy | 49 | 91.8 | 12.2 | 8.2 | 20.4 |
| Intellectual Property | 69 | 82.6 | 42.0 | 1.4 | 42.0 |
| Defamation | 43 | 81.4 | 16.3 | 2.3 | 18.6 |
| Sexual Content | 45 | 88.9 | 31.1 | 8.9 | 37.8 |
| Others | 55 | 96.4 | 18.2 | 7.3 | 23.6 |
| All categories | 610 | 89.0 | 23.4 | 6.7 | 28.5 |
Can Arabic models judge their own safety?
Prompted as four class judges (refusal, safe, controversial, unsafe), the Arabic models fall well short of a dedicated safeguard. Karnak 1 is the best judge at 59.3% overall, then ALLaM 2 at 51.3% and Fanar 2 at 47.0%. Scores depend on who wrote the response: Fanar 2 reaches 65.6% on Karnak 1’s answers but only 38.3% on its own.
| Judge | Responses by ALLaM 2 | Responses by Fanar 2 | Responses by Karnak 1 | Overall |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALLaM 2 | 57.3† | 52.5 | 44.0 | 51.3 |
| Fanar 2 | 37.1 | 38.3† | 65.6 | 47.0 |
| Karnak 1 | 62.1 | 57.5 | 58.3† | 59.3 |
† marks a model judging its own responses. 480 responses per source, 1,440 in total.
How good are the dialect translations?
Each dialect version came from a translate, critique and revise loop, which beat direct and reasoning guided prompting on every dimension in an LM judge comparison of 500 outputs. Native speakers rated 120 MSA to Egyptian translations at 4.85 out of 5 overall, and at least 93.3% of items scored 4 or 5 on every dimension. Of 157 translations the model first refused, all but 2 were recovered, so the most harmful prompts were not silently dropped.
Translation strategy comparison as a table (LM judge, 0 to 100)Show tableHide table
| Metric | Direct | Reasoning guided | Self refinement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naturalness | 92.60 | 95.67 | 98.63 |
| Idiomatic accuracy | 92.61 | 95.48 | 98.56 |
| Morphology and grammar | 97.17 | 97.91 | 99.63 |
| Semantic preservation | 99.70 | 99.83 | 99.95 |
| Average | 95.52 | 97.22 | 99.19 |
Native speaker validation currently covers Egyptian Arabic; the same protocol is being extended to Saudi, Moroccan, Syrian and Lebanese.
Contact
For questions, comments, or collaboration, reach out at salamahbench@compumacy.com.